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JUDICIAL PROCESS IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA:

THE PATRIATION REFERENCE AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
CHARTER OF RIGHTS
By A. WAYNE MACKAY*

Debates about the proper role of judges in Canada have taken on a new,
exciting dimension because of the 1982 amendments to the Canadian Constitution. The "quasi-entrenchment" ' of certain rights in the Constitution will cast
Canadian courts in a new and unfamiliar role. While the mere mention of the
role of courts arouses legal academics, it has traditionally sent practitioners
scurrying for cover. This should no longer be true, as judicial strategies will be
as important as the words of the CanadianCharterofRights itself.

The fate of the Charterof Rights rests squarely with the judges who will
be called upon to interpret it. Judicial attitudes and methodologies are crucial
to the effective implementation of any bill of rights. 2 There has been much
discussion about the exact wording of the Charterof Rights and the strengths
and weaknesses of its legislative drafting but the document itself is only a
beginning. Canada's judiciary and in particular, the Supreme Court of
Canada will either breathe life into the Charter of Rights, or reduce it to a
hollow promise of things that might have been.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF COURTS IN CANADA
It is timely to reconsider the role of judges in Canada. This paper focuses
upon the Supreme Court of Canada, and assesses its past and present performance in order to make predictions about its future role as interpreter of the
Charter of Rights. The focus is justified by the importance of the Supreme
Court as Canada's final appellate court. There is no intent to diminish the im-

© Copyright, 1983, A. Wayne MacKay.

* Presently an Associate Professor of Law at Dalhousie University and former law
clerk to Chief Justice Laskin (1978-79). An earlier version of this paper was delivered by
Professor MacKay at a conference in Halifax, March 6, 1982. The conference was en-

titled "The Canadian Charter of Rights: Law Practice Revolutionized."

IThis term is used because the override provision in section 33 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms Part I (ss. 1-34) of the Constitution Act, 1982,
Sched. B of the CanadaAct 1982, c. 11 (U.K.). [hereinafter referred to as the Charter]

makes the entrenchment of rights conditional. Courts and legislatures are invited to
jointly give shape to the Charter. Whether this is a futile attempt to "have your cake

and eat it too" remains to be seen.

2 McWhinney, The Supreme Court and the Bill of Rights parativeJurisprudence(1959), 37 Can. B. Rev. 16, at 22-32.

The Lessons of Com-
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portance of the front line trial judges and the provincial courts of appeal.
Many cases never go beyond trial, if indeed they get to court at all. Litigants
often cannot afford to pursue their case on appeal. Furthermore, trial courts
are not always as mindful of the judicial hierarchy as is commonly believed.
Lower courts demonstrated their ability to sabotage a Supreme Court strategy
in the American struggle to desegregate schools. 3 But lower courts and their
significance for the CharterofRights is a topic for another day.
Focus upon the Canadian Supreme Court is also timely in another
respect. The patriation of the Canadian Constitution has been described as the
removal of the last vestiges of British colonialism. Canada removed her badge
of judicial colonialism much earlier than her legislative one. When appeals to
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were abolished in 1949 a flurry of
scholarly writing 4 speculated about the reaction of the Supreme Court to its
new found freedom and independence. A similar interest in the Supreme Court
of Canada will undoubtedly be rekindled by placing the Charterof Rights in
the Court's lap. Interest in the Court coincides with assertions of Canadian independence.
The abolition of Privy Council appeals in 1949 was not free from controversy. 5 Indeed, there was a concerted effort in the House of Commons to
legislate stare decisis, so as to bind the Canadian Supreme Court by past decisions of the Privy Council and future decisions of the Court itself. 6 Most
Members of Parliament spoke in favour of stare decisis and abandoned their
position only on assurances that the Court would continue in its old ways. 7 A
concern was expressed that the Court free of prior decisions, might lose its
neutrality and become too intimately involved in the political process. 8 Similar
concerns undoubtedly will resurface in the inevitable debate about how the
Court should proceed in interpreting the CharterofRights.
There was a provision in the original Supreme Court Act 9 that was intended to abolish appeals to the Privy Council. In view of this fact the Parliamentary furor over abolition of Privy Council appeals is even more surprising.
There are some important differences between the Supreme Court's escape
from the Privy Council and its present qualified escape from Canadian
3Weiler, Two Models of JudicialDecision Making (1968),

459.

46 Can. B. Rev. 406, at

4MacGuigan, Precedentand Policy In the Supreme Court (1967), 45 Can. B. Rev.

627, is an example of the outpouring which demonstrates that the interest continued for
some5years after 1949.
Re Privy CouncilAppeals, [1940] S.C.R. 49; aff'd. [1947] A.C. 127 (P.C., Can.)

sub nom. A.G. Ont. v. A.G. Can. Because the provinces consented to the abolition,

there was no issue of unilateral patriation at the amendment stage.
6This effort was approved by the Canadian Bar Association but opposed by the
Canadian Association of Law Teachers. Laskin, English Law In CanadianCourts Since
The Abolition of Privy CouncilAppeals(1967), 29 Current Legal Problems 1 (reprinted

in monogram
form in 1976).
7

MacGuigan in his account of the debates indicated that only the Cooperative

Commonwealth Federation Party (C.C.F.) spoke against stare decisis, supra note 4, at
633.
8

Id., at 634-38.
91875, S.C., c. 11. The historical setting is discussed in Underhill, The Supreme
CourtAct and the Appeal to The Privy Council 1875-1876 (1938), Can. Hist. Rev. 245.
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legislatures. Nonetheless, it is important to understand the colonial roots of
the Supreme Court, as well as the Canadian nation that it serves.
The Supreme Court, and courts generally, have had a low profile in Canadian public life. Canada's constitutional tradition is significantly different
from that of the United States of America. An important part of this difference is the acceptance in Canada of the supremacy of parliament.
Legislators have been viewed as the protectors of rights in Canada and judicial
review of their decisions has been narrowly restricted. 10 Generally, courts have
been considered an inappropriate forum for the resolution of issues of broad12
public policy.'1 One notable exception to this approach is the reference
mechanism, which has involved the Court in important public issues including,
whether the
federal government could unilaterally patriate the Canadian Con13
stitution.
In Canada as in most federal states the Supreme Court is the final arbiter
of the Constitution. There was no celebrated case such as Marbury v.
Madison14 to establish this fundamental point. Indeed, this passing comment
of Kerwin C.J. in B.C. Power Corp. v. B.C. Electric Co. is most frequently

cited as authority for the courts' role as the arbiters:
It is conceded by counsel for the Attorney General of British Columbia that the

Courts have the jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of each of the
three statutes under attack in the present proceedings .... In a federal system it
appears to me that, in such circumstances, the Court has the same jurisdiction to
preserve assets whose title is dependent on the validity of the legislation as it has to
determine the validity of the legislation itself. 15
The Supreme Court has had the final word in legal disputes only since
abolition of Privy Council appeals in 1949. However, there is no entrenchment
of the Supreme Court in the Canadian Constitution even with its 1982 amendments. 16 The Court was established by a regular federal statute in 187517 and
subject to conventions to the contrary, this statute could be repealed by a simple majority vote in Parliament. 18 This is a telling reminder of the princir'e of
10 MacKay, Human Rights in CanadianSociety: Mechanismsfor Raising the Issues
andProvidingRedress (1977-78), 4 Dal. L.J. 739, at 744.
11Perhaps such issues required "polycentric" decision making as discussed by Professor Fuller in CollectiveBargainingand the Arbitrator,[1963] Wisc. L. Rev. 3.
12The Reference is a rather unique Canadian mechanism whereby provincial
governments may send "matters" to the provincial courts of appeal and the federal
government may send "matters" to the Supreme Court of Canada. The relevant legislation mandates the courts to decide the referred matters. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C.

1970, c.S-19, s. 55. There are equivalent provincial statutory provisions.
13 ConstitutionalAmendmentReferences 1981

(1981), 39 N.R. 1 (S.C.C.).
U.S. 137 (1803).
15 [1962] S.C.R. 642, at 644-45. This excerpt appears as an example of the courts as
constitutional interpreters in Whyte and Lederman, Canadian Constitutional Law
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1977) at 5-12 to 5-13.
16Section 41 of the Constitution Act, 1982, Sched. B of CanadaAct 1982, c. 11
145

(U.K.) does require unanimity in amending the composition of the Supreme Court of
Canada.
17Supra note 9.
18Bills were introduced in the House of Commons in 1879 and 1880 to abolish the
Supreme Court as an unnecessary expense but the debate floundered on matters of procedure. McRuer, The Supreme Court as a NationalInstitution (1980), 1 Sup. Ct. L.
Rev. 467, at 469.
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parliamentary supremacy. American-style separation of powers is not a part of
Canadian constitutionalism.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S RECORD ON BASIC RIGHTS ISSUES
Having set the institutional context, I shall take a brief backwards glance
at how the Supreme Court of Canada has approached and decided issues of
fundamental rights. The principle of parliamentary supremacy, in its broadest
interpretation suggests that basic rights and freedoms exist only at the sufferance of legislators. This might be true if legislatures spoke in clear and
precise terms and courts mechanically applied the clear rules, but such a view
misconceives both the legislative and judicial processes:
[t]he kind of reasoning involved in the legal process is one in which the classification changes as the classification is made. The rules changes as the rules are ap-

plied. 19
Canadian courts have used the important power of interpretation to strictly
construe statutes that infringe fundamental rights. This can lead to only a very
limited form of activism because basic rights are defined in very traditional
property terms. 20 Another limit upon the common law protection of rights is
the principle of statutory over-ride. A legislature bent upon removing basic
rights can reverse the common law by clear statutory language. Of course, the
same limit applies to judicial interpretation of the Charterof Rights by virtue
of the section 33 non obstante clause. 21
The Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation of the distribution of
powers stated in the ConstitutionAct, 186722 has played an important role in
the Court's protection of basic rights. This is only an indirect protection of
rights, and applies only to provincial violations of rights. 23 Nonetheless, the
division of powers strategy was used during the 1950s by Mr. Justice Rand and
others to protect Jehovah's Witnesses against the repression by Qu6bec
Premier Maurice Duplessis. 24
19
Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1974) at 3-4. Professor Levi suggests that the distinction between British and

American judges has been overstated.
20
Entick v. Carrington(1765), 95 E.R. 807 (K.B.).
21Part I of Constitution Act, 1982, Sched. B of Canada Act 1982, c. 11, s. 33
(U.K.). This constitutional override must be re-enacted every five years and is intended
to be used only on a statute by statute basis. Former Justice Minister, Jean Chr6tien,

publicly stated that using s. 33 would be political suicide, and concluded that its impact
in practical terms will be small (Dalhousie University Law Hour, Halifax, November,
1982). The present author disagrees with that view. In reference to a particular case,

-such as overriding prisoners' rights, the use of s. 33 may be quite popular politically.

221867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.) particularly sections 91 and 92. The name of this
and other constitutional statutes was changed as part of the patriation exercise.
23 The preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 gives residual power to the federal

government and the idea that there is an "Implied Bill of Rights" beyond the reach of
any government has never been accepted by a court majority. Abbott J.'s obiter dictum

in Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285, at 328 is the only clear acceptance of an "Implied Bill of Rights". He repeated his view in Oil, Chemical andAtomic Workers v. Imperial
24Oil, [1963] S.C.R. 584, at 600.
Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 and Switzman v. Elbling, [1957]

S.C.R. 285 are but two examples.
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In a seminal study Professor Gibson examined the leading cases involving
rights issues in the 1950s and discovered that 94% of them were decided in
favour of fundamental freedoms. 25 With the death of Premier Duplessis and
the retirement of Mr. Justice Rand, the bloom of judicial activism withered.
Two recent Supreme Court decisions legitimate invasions of basic rights even
at the provincial level. 26 This retreat from the activism of the 1950s was
ironically accompanied by the passing in 1960 of the CanadianBill of Rights27
[hereinafter the Bill ofRights].
Canadian judicial treatment of the Bill of Rights causes even the most ardent supporter of court activism 28 to pause. The dismal record of the Supreme
29
Court of Canada with regard to the Bill of Rights has been well chronicled.
Why the Court so restricted the impact of the Bill of Rights is an intriguing
question. In part the Bill's failure rests with the language of the document
itself; however, the caution with which the judges approached it poses a more
permanent problem. Professor Russell has commented that:
Our judges have been at their best in the field of civil liberties when, instead of being asked to theorise about such abstractions as equality before the law or due process of law, they have been called upon to identify the rights implicit in the working of our basic institutions of government .... 30
The above comment is disturbing because judges on the Supreme Court
and elsewhere will face a Charterof Rights full of abstractions. Courts will be
concerned with democratic rights that are not subject to the override provision
of the Charter, and section 26 permits judges to discover rights not
enumerated in the Charter of Rights. Nonetheless, the past record of the
Supreme Court offers little -hope for the progressive development of such
broad concepts as "freedom of conscience".
Chief Justice Laskin has a more positive view of the Court's role. While
still a law professor, he wrote:
The time has surely come in the history of our constitutional law to recognize the
conscious role that courts and judges have played in shaping federal and provincial
power and thereby controlling governmental policies. A sign of such recognition
resides in understanding how precedent and legal logic and advertence to extrinsic
materials have been used as formal tools in the tasks of interpretation. Yet it is the
use made of such tools and not the mere fact of their availability that is determinative. A disciminating or undiscriminating use of precedent, the depth or
shallowness of legal argument, the relevance or reliability of extrinsic evidence are
the reflections of the mind that is working on the problems of the constitution. We
may as well deny the existence of the court as to deny that judicial decisions are the
25 Gibson, And-One Step Backward: The Supreme Court and ConstitutionalLaw
in the26Sixties (1975), 53 Can. Bar Rev. 621 at 630, 648.
McNeil v. N.S. Board of Censors (1978), 25 N.S.R. (2d) 128 (S.C.C.) and A.G.
Canadav. Dupond(1978), 19 N.R. 478 (S.C.C.).
271960 S.C., c. 44 (now R.S.C. 1970, Appendix III).
28
This is quite apart from the concern expressed by Professor Dworkin in Taking
Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth Ltd., 1977), that activism can be for good or bad
and its
true test lies in the results.
29
Tarnopolsky, A New Bill of Rights in the Light of the Interpretationof the Present One by the Supreme Court of Canada, [1978] Law Soc. of Upp. Can. Spec. Lectures30161, is a good example.
Russell, The PoliticalRole of the Supreme Court of Canadain its FirstCentury
(1975), 53 Can. Bar Rev. 576, at 592.
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products of social and economic and political considerations for which the words
of the British North America Act are merely the vehicles of communication. The
constitution is as open as the31minds of those called upon to interpret it; it is as closed as their minds are closed.
Chief Justice Laskin may have been premature in expecting a recognition
of the importance of the Court's role in 1955. However, after the Court
entered its second century in 1975 and received control of its own agenda,3 2 his
expectations are more realistic. The expanded role that the Court will be asked
to play in relation to the Charterof Rights make the Chief Justice's final comments timely. Before speculating about the futureof the Court, the Constitu33
tional Amendment References 1981 [hereinafter the PatriationReference]
will be examined as a case study in judicial process.
III. THE PATRIATION REFERENCE: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL PROCESS
A.

The Supreme Court in the Limelight
Unlike its American counterpart, the Canadian Supreme Court has been a
relatively obscure institution dwelling somewhere in the mists of Ottawa's
bureaucracy. Recently the Canadian media have discovered the Court, but
they still do not appear to understand it. The recent referral of controversial
political issues to the Court such as the federal proposal to reform or abolish
the Canadian Senate34 and Qu6bec's language bill limiting the use of languages
other than French,35 has helped to raise its profile.
For many years Canadians viewed the Supreme Court through a British
filter and comparisons to the House of Lords were commonplace. An
American filter has now supplanted the British one and this has produced an
even greater distortion of reality.3 6 There has been little scholarly analysis of
the Supreme Court as a unique Canadian institution. This is hardly surprising
considering Russell's conclusion that the public impact of the Court during its
37
first century was minimal.
The role of the Court in the partriation process is a clear indication that
things have changed. Its deliberations in the PatriationReference 8 put the
31

Laskin, Tests for the Validity of Legislation: What's the Matter (1955-56), 11
U. of T. Law J. 114, at 127.
32 Pior to 1975 a large number of cases came to the Supreme Court of Canada as
of right, based upon such criteria as the amount of money in dispute. Since 1975 most
cases are heard only with leave of the Court. Dissents on issues of law in criminal cases
are one exception. The effect of this change was to make the Court a public law court
resolving issues of broad Canadian import.
33
Supra note 13.
34
Senate Reference, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54.
35
Blaikie v. A. G. Qudbec (1980), 30 N.R. 225 (S.C.C.).
36
Supra note 30, at 576.
37

Id.

38 Supra note 13. There is a certain irony in the fact that this Reference began in the
provincial courts of appeal of Manitoba, Qu6bec and Newfoundland and was only appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. In A.G. Ontario v. A.G. Canada(1912), 3
D.L.R. 509 (P.C.), the provinces argued that the Reference device would politicize the
Court. They lost. Seventy years later these provinces plunged the Court into its biggest
political controversy to date.
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Supreme Court squarely in the public eye. On September 28, 1981 the Court
delivered judgment in the most highly publicized, and arguably most important, case of its existence. For the first time in Canadian history, the rendering
of judgment was televised.
This case was heard as a single appeal in May 1981. It consolidated appeals from decisions on References to the Courts of Appeal in Manitoba, Newfoundland and Qu6bec. 3 9 The complexity of the decision was due in part to the
fusion of three sets of questions referred to the respective Courts of Appeal,
but in essence all the References raised the same issues.
At the heart of the Patriation Reference was the law and convention
dichotomy. All nine of the Supreme Court Justices accepted this to varying
degrees. Mr. Justices Martland and Ritchie came closest to rejecting a demarcation of law and convention in their dissenting reasons. This article will suggest that the dichotomy is coloured by the "lego-centrism" of the profession
that decides such matters.
The References consolidated in the PatriationReference were initiated by
the opposition of eight provinces 4° to a proposed resolution laid before the
House of Commons on October 6, 1980. The resolution contained an Address
to be presented to Her Majesty The Queen requesting that a measure to
patriate the British North America Act (with a consequent change of name to
the Constitution Act), to provide an amending formula, and to provide a
Charterof41Rights and Freedoms be laid before the Parliament of the United
Kingdom.
Provincial opposition to the proposed federal resolution was cast in terms
of three questions which were referred to three provincial Courts of Appeal.
The thrust of these questions was:
1. Would the enactment of the federal package in the proposed resolution affect
federal-provincial relations?

2. Is there a convention that a resolution that would result in an alteration of
federal-provincial relations, requires agreement of the provinces?

3. Is the agreement of the provinces constitutionally required for amendments affecting federal-provincial relations?
Manitoba's Court of Appeal was the first to respond. On February 3,
1981, it held by a three to two decision that the federal government did not
need provincial consent to proceed. 42 Four of the five Justices, including Chief
Justice Freedman, also held that there was no convention of provincial consent. Hall J.A. was of the opinion that the question about the convention was
non-justiciable.
The Newfoundland Court of Appeal, composed of three judges, held in a
39References

Re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada(1981), 117 D.L.R.

(3d) 1 (Man. C.A.) and 118 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (Nfld. C.A.), 120 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (Que.

C.A.).40

Manitoba, Alberta, British Columbia, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland
and Qudbec originally opposed the resolution and they were later joined by Nova Scotia
and Saskatchewan, leaving only Ontario and New Brunswick to support the federal

stance.
41 This federal resolution was embodied in the CanadaAct 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
42
Supra note 39.
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unanimous judgment delivered on March 31, 1981 that provincial rights would
be affected by the proposed enactment, that a convention of provincial consent exists and that such
consent for the proposed resolution would be con43
stitutionally required.
Finally, the Qu6bec Court of Appeal (responding to differently worded
questions) held in a four to one decision that the federal government could
proceed unilaterally with its patriation proposals. 4 In reaching this conclusion, the Court denied the existence of a convention of provincial consent.
The proposed resolution was put before the Supreme Court of Canada in
May, 1981. The most notable departure from the arguments in the courts
below was the position put forward by Professor Lysyk for the Province of
Saskatchewan. He abandoned the principle of unanimity and argued that the
relevant convention required substantial, rather than unanimous provincial
consent. After several days of highly publicized hearings, the Court reserved
judgment.
In September, the Court delivered its judgment consisting of four opinions - two majorities and two dissents. Describing these judgments is complicated by the fact that their individual authors are not identified. 45
A Group of Seven judges subscribed to a judgment which bears the
distinctive style and flare of Chief Justice Laskin. In this part all but two of the
Supreme Court justices held that it was legal for the federal government to
proceed with its proposed resolution without the consent of the provinces.
The dissenters, Martland and Ritchie J.J., held that it would be illegal for
the federal government to proceed without provincial consent. This judgment,
which has the precise and logical flow of Mr. Justice Martland's writing,
focused upon the questions referred to the Qu6bec Court of Appeal. The focus
was not on whether there were legal impediments to the federal government's
proposed course of action but rather whether there was any authority for it at
all.
One of the most puzzling judgments is that of the Group of Six. This
judgment, which reflects the style and structure as well as the constitutional expertise of Mr. Justice Beetz, attracted a strange alliance of judges. Mr. Justice
Dickson and the three Qu6bec judges joined forces with Mr. Justices Martland
and Ritchie to hold that the consent of the provinces was constitutionally required in the conventional sense. It agreed with the Group of Seven that there
was no legal sanction for a breach of convention; nonetheless, it did not shrink
from declaring that a convention of substantial provincial consent existed
which would be breached by the proposed course of action. Hence, the provinces could claim a partial victory because the federal plan, for all its legality,
was constitutionally immoral. 46
43

1d. A fourth question concerning Newfoundland's Terms of Union is not rele-

vant.
44Id.
45

This was a practice followed by the Supreme Court of Canada in two earlier decisions of national dimensions. Re Authority of Parliament in Relation to the Upper
House, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54 and Blaikie v. A-G Qudbec (1980), 30 N.R. 225. However,
both of those cases were unanimous decisions of the Court.
I Dicey, Law of the Constitution(10th ed., London: MacMillan, 1960) at 23-24.
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In a spirit of slightly irritated dissent a Group of Three, composed of
Laskin, Estey and McIntyre, parted company with their six brethren on the
convention issue. It held in a judgment which once again has the ring of Chief
Justice Laskin, that there is no convention of provincial consent. On this point
the group agreed with the conclusions of Chief Justice Freedman of the
Manitoba Court of Appeal. It also agreed with the Group of Six both on the
nature of conventions and on their lack of legal impact. However, the Group
of Three held that the question on the convention of provincial consent was
non-justiciable. The dissenters addressed this issue with reservation, in
response to the lengthy reasons of the majority Group of Six.
B.

Laws and Conventions in Courts

Before examining the legal process implications of the Patriation
Reference for the judicial process, it is useful to analyse the substance of the
decision. Apart from the fact that process cannot be discussed in a vacuum,
the Court's views on convention provide insights into its view of the judicial
role. Upon what sources may a court draw to legitimate its decisions? This is
an issue of broad significance but it also has particular relevance to the judicial
determination of rights.
Will Canadian courts define the abstract concepts stated in the Charterof
Rights in light of the traditions and conventions of Canadian society? This
issue has not been resolved in the United States despite almost two centuries of
experience with a bill of rights. 47 Section 1 of the CharterofRights, subjecting
the guaranteed rights and freedoms to such limits as are reasonable in a free
and democratic society, invites courts to examine the traditions and conventions of Canadians to assist them in deciding what limits are reasonable. 48 The
Supreme Court's view of convention is, therefore, a matter of practical importance.
Drawing a line between law and convention is more defensible from a
perspective of traditional constitutional law than from a broader jurisprudential one. Yet, to come to grips with what the Supreme Court of Canada had to
say about law and convention, we must look at the distinctions in a broader
context. Its substantive comments on this subject can be analysed in terms of
three models: the primacy of law model, the primacy of convention model,
and the parity of law and convention model. Dicey was one of the early champions of the primacy of law model. He asserted that law and convention could
be clearly distinguished because the former is enforceable in the courts, while
the latter is not. 49 In somewhat less extreme form the Dicey view has been
adopted by more recent constitutional scholars. 50
The primacy of convention model runs counter to constitutional orthodoxy. To some extent this model involves a rejection of constitutionalism.
47 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (particularly the opinion of

Harlan
J.).
48

This approach could have a chilling impact on the effect of the Charterof Rights
as Canadians have been described as deferential to authority. Friedenberg, Deference to
Authority (White Plains, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1980).
49

50

Supra note 46.

Marshall, Constitutional Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) and Hogg,

ConstitutionalLawof Canada(Toronto: The Carswell Co., 1977).
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A.M. Honor6 has effectively described the primacy of convention in the wake
of a revolution:
Should one not therefore go on to ask whether some principle of law independent
of any particular system authorizes a judge, simply by virtue of his office, and irrespective of the source of his jurisdiction, to recognize the revolutionary regime?
Of course this notion of an inter-systematic or supra-systematic law sounds rather
startling. It amounts to a resuscitation of 'natural law' or some such dinosaur, and
rubs against nearly two centuries of positivism, and (what is more important) constitutionalism, which is part of the political ideology of which postivisim is the
legal reflection ....
This way of looking at the matter would involve the abandonment of that
deification of the territorial state which is another of the complex strands that go
to make up the ideological background of legal positivism. And if it is possible to
jettison the exclusive status of the territorial state as a source of law, why is it not
also possible to abandon constitutionalism in its exclusive guise, which holds that
law unless constituted in accordance with predetermined and
nothing can count as 51
systematized criteria?
Jennings has asserted that law outside the context of conventions is often
unintelligible. 52 The Constitution Act, 1867 provides a good example of this.
According to the letter of the law, the Governor General of Canada rules in a
discretionary fashion in the name of the Queen. Only when the law is put it its
conventional context does it become clear that it is really an elected Cabinet
which acts in the name of the Governor General. Professor Lederman goes one
step further and argues that law derives its validity from convention. "Constitutional law arises out of our whole history and tradition as a people, and
one must constantly relate these rules and principles of law and government to
the organic ongoing life of our national community, from which they derive
their validity." ' 53 On this view constitutional law draws its life from the conventions of the society and to that extent the latter are primary.
The parity of law and convention model, as the label suggests, is a halfway house between the two extremes. Jennings seems to espouse it in The Law
indicated, law and convention
of the Constitution.54 In his view, as has been
55
are equal partners in constitutional practice.
The Group of Seven rejected the idea that conventions could crystallize
into law. Its members conceded that conventions could be adopted by statute,
but denied that the court could fashion a kind of constitutional common law
that could transform them into law. In reaching this conclusion they rejected
the views of Lederman 56 and Jennings. 5 7 Not surprisingly therefore, it took a
51

Honor6, Reflections on Revolution (1967), 2 Ir. Jur. (N.S.) 268, at 275-76.
Jennings, The Law andthe Constitution(5th ed., London: University of London
Press,53 1955).
Lederman, ConstitutionalAmendment And Canadian Unity, [1978] Law Soc.
Upp. Can. Spec. Lectures 17, at 18.
54
Supra note 52.
55
1d. at 130-31.
56
Lederman, The Process of ConstitutionalAmendment for Canada (1966), 12
McGill L.J. 371.
57
Supra note 52, at 126.
52
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different view of the cases upon which these two scholars relied. 58 The adoption of the following quotation 59 leaves no doubt that the primacy of law
model was preferred.
The validity of conventions cannot be the subject of proceedings in a court of law.

Reparation for a breach of such rules will not be effected by any legal sanction.
There are no cases which contradict these propositions. In fact, the idea of a court
convention is so strange that the question hardly arises. (emenforcing a mere
phasis added)60
Dissenting reasons of Martland and Ritchie J.J. throw no light upon the
nature of conventions. Their views on conventions must be determined from
the reasons of the Group of Six of which they were also members.
Without abandoning the primacy of law model, the Group of Six placed
conventions closer to law in the legal hierarchy: "[tihe main purpose of constitutional conventions is to ensure that the legal framework of the Constitution will be operated in accordance with the prevailing constitutional values or
principles of the period." 6 1 The Group of Six adopted the opinion of Chief
Justice Freedman of the Manitoba Court of Appeal who had also placed convention higher than custom but lower than law. 62 As members of the Group of
Seven, Mr. Justice Dickson and the three Quebec judges adopted the primacy
of lav model. Here, as in the Group of Seven judgment the argument that conventions can crystallize into law is rejected. There is also implicit disagreement
with63Jennings' view that courts do not directly enforce either conventions or
law.
In spite of its lip-service to legal primacy, the reasons given by the Group
of Six exemplify on the whole the thinking of the parity of law and convention
model; Canada's Constitution is declared to be composed of two parts, constitutional law and constitutional convention. 64 It is even conceded that some
conventions are more important than laws. 65 Indeed, the Group of Six concluded that action in breach of the convention requiring substantial provincial
consent, 66 would be unconstitutional. The concurrence of Mr. Justice Dickson
and the three Quebec justices is difficult to reconcile with their participation in
the Group of Seven discussion of "mere" conventions.
There is no doubt that the Group of Three adopted the primacy of law
model. It cited and accepted the views of Professor Dicey. 67 Like the majority
58

Labour Conventions Case, [1936] S.C.R. 461; Reference Re Disallowance,
[1938]59S.C.R. 71; British CoalCorporationv. TheKing, [1935] A.C. 500 (P.C.).
Supra note 13, at 33.
60Munro, Laws and Conventions Distinguished(1975), 91 Law Q. Rev. 218, at
228. 61
Supra note 13, at 192.
62
Supra note 39, at 13-14 (Man. C.A.).
63
Supra note 52, at 130-31.
64
Supra note 13, at 195.
65
Id.at 195.
66
The existence of the convention was established on the basis of the criteria
by Jennings, supra note 52, at 134-36; supra note 13, at 197-220.
enumerated
67
Supra note 13, at 263-65.
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Group of Six, the three dissenters accepted the definition of conventions given
by Chief Justice Freedman in the Manitoba Court of Appeal. 68 However, they
expressed some concern about the application of conventions:
In a federal state where the essential feature of the Constitution must be the
distribution of powers between the two levels of government, each supreme in its
own legislative sphere, constitutionality and legality must be synonymous, and
conventional rules will be accorded less69significance than they may have in a
unitary state such as the United Kingdom.

Regarding the nature of such a convention, the Group of Three asserted
that substantial provincial consent was too vague and ill-defined to be
workable; neither its observance nor its breach could be clearly identified.
Constitutional scholar Geoffrey Marshall suggested, in a letter to The Times,
that this kind of reasoning confused the existence of a convention with its application. 70 This confusion may stem from the acceptance by the Group of
Three of the primacy of law model.
The Supreme Court spoke with discordant voices about the legal
significance of conventions. Six judges were willing to accord some conventions judicial weight. The way in which they did this reveals more about
judicial creativity than the potential use of conventions in determining basic
rights. It is time to focus on the judicial process.
C.

The Processof Decision-Making

In the PatriationReference all of the Justices of the Supreme Court of
Canada implicitly reaffirmed the supremacy of Parliament. This reaffirmation
is ironical, in so far as the Charter of Rights imposes some limits on this
supremacy. The Group of Seven asserted that the federal Parliament could
legally amend the ConstitutionAct, 1867 by joint resolution. In its view, there
was nothing in the Canadian Constitution to prohibit it. Mr. Justices Martland
and Ritchie were less deferential to Parliament, yet even they did not question
its supremacy within the limits of the Constitution. They focused not on
whether there was a constitutional prohibition but on whether there was express constitutional authority for the proposed federal action. 71
It is ironic that Justices Martland and Ritchie should be less deferential to
the powers of Parliament than their brethren. More than any other judges of
the present Supreme Court, they have advocated a restrained judicial role and
deference to the will of the elected representatives of the people. 72 Are the telltale signs of the result-oriented judicial process beginning to emerge?
68
69

Supra note 39, at 13-14 (Man. C.A.).
Supra note 13, at 262.

71Marshall, "Ruling
on Canada's Constitution", The Times (London), Nov. 3,
1981. Professor Marshall continued to demonstrate an interest in Canadian patriation
with two subsequent articles. The United Kingdom Parliament and the British North
America Acts (1981), 19 Alta.L.Rev. 352 and Amendment and Patriation(1981), 19
Alta.L.Rev.
363.
71

Supra note 13, at 110.
A.G. Canadav. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349; R. v. Burnshine (1974), 44 D.L.R.
(3d) 584 (S.C.C.) and Walter v. A.G. Alberta, [1969] S.C.R. 383 provide but a few ex72

amples of Justices Martland and Ritchie deferring to the legislative will. In the first two
cases they failed to defer to a competing legislative enactment - the CanadianBill of
Rights, but this was also in the name of restraint.
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Debates about the proper role of courts in the Canadian political sphere
are not new. A classic example of this debate appeared in an earlier case which
also involved a conflict of fundamental values - Harrisonv. Carswell.73 In
this case the conflict was between private property rights and free speech rights
to picket. Mr. Justice Dickson speaking for a majority of six, which included
Justices Martland and Ritchie, made the following statement:
The submission that this Court should weigh and determine the respective values
to society of the right to property and the right to picket raises important and difficult political and socio-economic issues, the resolution of which must, by their
very nature, be arbitrary and embody personal economic and social beliefs. It
raises also fundamental questions as to the role of this Court under the Canadian
Constitution. The duty of the Court, as I envisage it, is to proceed in the discharge
of its adjudicative function in a reasoned way from principled decision and
established concepts. I do not for a moment doubt the power of the Court to act
creatively - it has done so on countless occasions; but manifestly one must
ask - what are the limits of the judicial function? There are many varied answers
to this question. Holmes, J. said in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1917), 244
U.S. 205, at 221: "I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate,
but they can do it only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular actions". Cardozo, the Nature of the JudicialProcess (1921) p. 141, recognized that
the freedom of the judge is not absolute in this expression of his view:
This judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit
of his own ideal of beauty or74of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration
from consecrated principles.
Notwithstanding this statement, Justices Dickson, Martland and Ritchie
were all members of the Group of Six which held that there was a convention
of substantial provincial consent which rendered the proposed amendment
package unconstitutional in the conventional sense. This is one of the most
creative majority judgments ever delivered by the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Group of Six strayed a long way from the "consecrated principles" and
"established concepts" of constitutional litigation, in answering the convention question in terms of substantial provincial consent, instead of the
unanimous provincial consent for which seven of the eight opposing provinces
contended.
On the other hand, Chief Justice Laskin, who was a member of the
dissenting Group of Three, expressed an expansive view of the judicial role in
his dissenting judgment in Harrisonv. Carswell:
This Court, above all others in this country, cannot be simply mechanistic about
previous decisions, whatever be the respect it would pay to such decisions ....
It seems to me that the present case involves a search for an appropriate legal
of an old doctrine
framework for new social facts which show up the inaptness
75
developed upon a completely different social foundation.
The above statement might be regarded by many as illustrative of the
creative and even activist role espoused by the Chief Justice. Although this
assessment has some validity with respect to cases concerning fundamental
rights and criminal law, 76 it is not directly applicable to constitutional matters.
73 (1975), 5 N.R. 523 (S.C.C.).
74
Id. at 529-30.
75
Id. at 534-37.
76
R. v. Forsythe (1980), 32 N.R. 520 (S.C.C.) demonstrates that even in this field
there are limits to judicial creativity.
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A close reading of Chief Justice Laskin's numerous constitutional decisions
and his landmark text, Canadian ConstitutionalLaw, 77 reveal a more traditional judicial approach to constitutional disputes. Laskin the legal scholar
predominates over Laskin the social engineer. It is Laskin, the constitutional
scholar, whose views permeate the judgments of the Group of Seven and the
Group of Three.
The intent of the foregoing is neither to belittle judges for inconsistency
nor to suggest that they are hypocritical, but rather to demonstrate that
abstract views about the proper judicial role and preordained legal principles
will not necessarily stand in the way of reaching a "desirable" result. I do not
accept Professor Wechsler's argument that there are neutral principles that
transcend any immediate result. 78 At the very least, judges are selecting the
principles they consider most desirable, and their desirability is often related to
the particular case result:
When they decide what is a "desirable" result judges must of course operate
within the limits of the law and judicial conventions. They must also take account of social and political values. Failing to take account of these realities in
reaching a constitutional decision is as great a sin as giving them too much
weight. The real reasons for coming to a particular judicial decision are often
hidden beneath a legal umbrella. This lack of candour is unfortunate. In a different context Honor6 offered some useful advice that should be heeded by
judges and legal commentators:
What is needed, I believe, is to open the windows and let in the air, to appreciate
that the phenomena are more complex and varied than they seem, and to state
frankly what political values are being commended by the supporters of different
types of theory. In this field neutrality is neither possible nor desirable, and the
most misleading79 theory is that which claims to be neutral between different
political values.
Those who insist upon legal purity and complete consistency in the
judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada are unaware of the nature of the
judicial decision-making process. Reasons are circulated among the judges of
the Court before they are made final, and a judge who wishes to attract a majority of the Court to his or her conclusion may have to modify some of his
language. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court
commented, a judge never writes with greater freedom than when he writes in
80
dissent.
The judgment of the Group of Six was undoubtedly the result of judicial
compromise. Although many will be offended by this view of judicial decisionmaking, it is realistic. Moreover, a country that celebrates the constitutional
accord as epitomizing the national spirit of compromise, should not expect her
judges to shun it. If law is regarded as a means and not an end, compromise
should be less alarming.
77Laskin, Canadian ConstitutionalLaw (4th ed., Toronto: The Carswell Co.,
1975).78
Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw (1959), 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, at 19.
79
Supra note 51, at 278.
80
Frankfurter, FelixFrankfurterReminisces (New York: Reynal, 1960), at 298.
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JudicialProcessModels

The judicial process implicit in the four judgments can be analyzed with
the aid of two models.. The essence of the "result-oriented model" is that the
desired result conditions the legal reasoning rather than the reverse. In this
model a judge begins with a social result considered desirable, and works
backwards from it to fashion justifying legal reasons. A privative clause
designed to prevent judicial review of a decision is a good example. A judge
construing a privative clause might construe it narrowly because he or she
believes that people should not be denied access to the courts. Although the
reasons are cast in legal terms, the heart of the decision is its result orientation;
the result is dictated by social considerations - the access of citizens to the
courts.

A second model is the "legal reasoning model". There are two variants to
this model. One favours inductive reasoning. Judges begin with the facts: by
selecting appropriate legal principles and applying them to the facts, they
reach the correct legal result. This is the branch of the model that has traditionally been associated with the common law.
An alternative form of the legal reasoning model is deductive in nature.
According to this branch, a judge begins with legal imperatives that predetermine the results of most, if not all, fact situations. His task is to determine
whether the facts of the case come under the provisions of the law. Facts will
be relevant only if they help him to determine whether the case is or is not
covered by the law. The judge seeks results, but the results are seen as the
upholding of the law. What counts is not the social result, but the legal result.
For example, if a judge accepts as a matter of legal doctrine that no privative
clause, however worded, could exclude court review for jurisdictional error,
then he or she has a legal result-orientation. This judge will fashion the reasons
and select the facts so as to give effect to this legal doctrine limiting the force
of privative clauses.
A clear line cannot always be drawn between the deductive branch of the
legal reasoning model, characterized by a legal result-orientation, and the
result-oriented model, which focuses on social results. Nonetheless, the two
models are theoretically different. For the purposes of understanding the
judicial process there is a relevant distinction similar to the separation of social
policies and legal principles enunciated by Dworkin. 8
In the result-oriented model the law is viewed as a means to achieve a particular social end. In the example of the privative clause, the law is to be construed so as to give the citizen maximum access to the courts of the land. On
the other hand, the proponents of the legal reasoning model consider the law
an end rather than a means. In administrative law, privative clauses must be
construed so as to permit review for jurisdictional error, but the same clause
82
can be construed as barring judicial review for non-jurisdictional error.
Hence, the court can label the error in the original decision as jurisdictional or
81

Dworkin, The Philosophy of Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1979) at

43-49.82

de Smith, JudicialReview ofAdministrativeAction, ed. Evans (4th ed. London:
Stevens, 1980) at 357-76.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 21, NO.

I

non-jurisdictional depending upon whether it desires to review. Maintaining
the legal purity of judicial review doctrine is the relevant end. This is a matter
of legal principle rather than social policy.
Although they ate mutually exclusive in logic, one reason why the legal
reasoning model and the result-orientation model are often combined in practice is that judges can have more than one result in mind. They may desire
maximum access to the courts but also desire to achieve it within traditional
judicial review doctrine, thus maintaining legal purity. For example, they may
have to label jurisdictional an error that would otherwise be non-jurisdictional
to allow judicial review. Even in such apparent combinations, however, one
model is likely to predominate. Only on the surface have judges maintained
the purity of the legal doctrine by the change of labels discussed above. In
reality, the law has been manipulated to achieve a particular social result.
E. Applying the ProcessModels
Without knowledge of the views and record of its author, it is difficult to
determine whether an anonymous judgment is determined by a resultorientation. Primafacie,a concurring judge agrees not only with the decision
but also with the reasons given. In reality, however, a judge will write his own
reasons, concurring in the result, only if he seriously disagrees with those offered by another judge reaching the same decision.
In the judgment given by the Group of Seven there is no immediately apparent result-orientation. Indeed the form and logic of the reasons appear to
fit the legal reasoning model. There is an express disavowal of any comment
'on the contents of the amendment package. 83 If the Group of Seven judgment
had a particular aim it was to fashion a legal solution devoid of political and
social biases. This group stated explicitly that: ".

.

. the legal arguments pro

and con do not engage the contents of the package, and it is impossible to
qualify the issue of legality by considerations of fairness or equity or political
acceptability or even judicial desirability." 84
The Group of Seven assumed that there was a theoretical, socially neutral
legal position to be fashioned in accordance with orthodox constitutional principles. But even those who proceed from bstablished legal principles have to
make choices. And it is on the choice that the result depends. For example, the
Group of Seven chose to ask whether there were any express prohibitions
against the federal government proceeding by resolution. 85 Had it asked
whether there was express legal authority to so proceed, the logical legal result
might have been different. The style and form of the Group of Seven reasons
are inductive, but there is also a trace of the deductive type of legal reasoning.
In effect, the reasons affirm a legal view of federalism in which the powers of
the federal government are superior to those of the provinces. It should be
remembered, however, that even within the legal reasoning model conclusions
may not be mandated by logic, but may have to be chosen from logical alternatives. There is frequently more than one correct solution to a legal problem.
83

Supra note 13, at 56-57.

4Id. at 38.
85

Id. at 34, 57.
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It would be unrealistic to suppose that the Group of Seven ignored the
social impact of its decision. Some judges undoubtedly viewed declaring the
proposed federal action legal, as a step towards desirable political change.
However, the law was not manipulated to that end. Indeed, Mr. Justice
Dickson and the three Qu6bec Justices also concurred in the Group of Six
judgment, which had a very different political impact. It might have been expected that the judgment of the Group of Seven, if written by Chief Justice
Laskin, would betray a social result-orientation. But none is apparent. If the
Chief Justice has a federalist view of the Constitution, it is based upon a particular reading of the Constitution Act, 1867. Of course, he brings his own
perspective to his reading of constitutional cases. This would include the fact
that he is from Ontario - a province that has a vested interest in promoting a
federalist view of Canada. Nonetheless, the judgment espouses a position that
can be defended in traditional legal terms and, on its face, it does not fit the
result-oriented model of judicial decision-making.
On the legality issue, the dissenting judgment of the Group of Two fits the
result-oriented model. Mr. Justice Martland, the likely author of these
reasons, and Mr. Justice Ritchie, concurred in an uncharacteristically creative
statement of Canadian federalism.8 6 They answered the Qu6bec formulation
of the referred question, seeking direct authority for the proposed resolution:
At the outset, we would point out that we are not concerned with the matter of
legality or illegality in the sense of determining whether or not the passage of the
resolution under consideration involves a breach of the law.87The issue is as to the
existence of a power to do that -whichis proposed to be done.
This is an unusual position for two judges who throughout their careers
have been very deferential to the will of Parliament. One may also wonder
what they were concerned with if not with issues of legality. They appeared to
adopt the philosophy of Lord Denning that "[1]egal theory must give way to
practical politics," 8 8 leaving little doubt about their distaste for the proposed
federal action.
This is an attempt by the Federal Parliament to accomplish indirectly that which it
is legally precluded from doing directly by perverting the recognized resolution
method of obtaining constitutional amendments by the Imperial Parliament for an
improper purpose. 89
It should be emphasized that their distaste was for a particular view of
Canadian federalism, not for federal government in general nor for a particular Liberal regime. Indeed, they felt that the Court should exercise its inherent power to preserve federalism in the Constitution. They had a clear
result in mind - the preservation of their view of federalism in the constitutional structure of Canada. This may be a perfectly sensible and desirable way
to solve a constitutional problem. Result-orientation is not in itself a bad
thing. It does not, however, promote consistency.
86
Lyon, ConstitutionalTheory and the Martland-RitchieDissent (1981), 7 Queens
L.J. 135, praises this dissent for emphasizing the substance of the resolution rather than
its form.
8
7 Supra note 13, at 110.
88
Blackburn v. Attorney General, [1971] 2 All E.R. 1380, at 1382.
89
Supra note 13, at 142.
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Upon what basis did the Group of Two arrive at its conclusion about the
nature of Canadian federalism? Justices Martland and Ritchie would likely
reply that their view of federalism is a legal one, based upon a proper reading
of the Constitution Act. If such a view emerges from the Constitution Act,

1867, it is only by implication. Furthermore, this implication appears only
when the legal Constitution is placed in its political context. The compact
theory of Confederation soundly rejected by the majority Group of Seven, 9°
would support the view of federalism of the Group of Two. The compact
theory, however, if it has any credence at all, is a political construct and not a
legal one.
The reasons of the Group of Two are stated in legal terms with an emphasis on statutory analysis and judicial precedent. But the use of the style of
the legal reasoning model is only a facade. In support of the sovereignty of the
provinces within their own spheres the dissentors quote a speech of Mr. Louis
St. Laurent, then President of the Canadian Bar Association.91 This is hardly
as solid a primary source of law as both Justices Martland and Ritchie usually
demand from counsel who appear before them. Although both Justices would
likely see themselves as followers of the legal reasoning model, they have on
92
previous occasions demonstrated a result-orientation.
Demonstrating a degree of political realism, the group held that it is the
federal joint resolution that amends the ConstitutionAct, 1867 in substantive
terms and that the United Kingdom approval is essentially pro forma.93 This
analysis
of the realities of the amendment process is supported by Professor
Scott, 94 but comments from London during the controversy surrounding the
PatriationReference cast some doubt on the theory of automatic British approval. The Group of Two resorted to an argument in terrorem, reasoning that
the effect of the federal argument would be that provinces -xist only at the sufferance of the federal Parliament. 95 This provides further evidence of a result
-orientation.
The second set of majority reasons, subscribed to by the Group of Six,
most clearly fits the result-orientation model. These reasons were a compromise apparently intended to force the federal and provincial governments
90Id. at 52.
91
Id. at 130-31.
92In GayAlliance TowardEqualityv. Vancouver Sun (1979), 27 N.R. 117 (S.C.C.)
Martland J., with Ritchie J. concurring, relied heavily on the American Bill ofRights to
deny human rights protections to gay people. This is remarkable because both judges
have in the past consistently rejected arguments based upon the American Bill of
Rights. One example is R. v. Miller and Cockriell(1976), 70 D.L.R. (3d) 324 (S.C.C.).

93Justices Martland and Ritchie have not always shown this preference for
substance over form. This is illustrated by Walter v. A.G. Alberta, [1969] S.C.R. 383 in
which the focus was the property overtones of the statute rather than the substantive intention to limit the holdings of the Hutterites in Alberta.
94
Scott, Essays on the Constitution(Toronto: U. of Tor. Press, 1977) at 204-205.
95
Supranote 13, at 136.

96 The Group of Six provides the best example of the statesmanship described by
Professor Russell, "The Supreme Court Decision: Bold Statescraft Based on Questionable Jurisprudence," in Russell et al., The Court and the Constitution (Kingston:
Inst. of Intergov't Rel's, 1982) at 1.
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back to the bargaining table. 96 The composition of the Group of Six is interesting. Justices Martland and Ritchie who dissented on the issue of legality,
are consistent in their espousal of a philosophy of political realism. Dickson,
Beetz, Chouinard and Lamer J.J., who as members of the Group of Seven had
adopted the legal reasoning model, were less consistent.
Manipulation of the law to achieve a specific end is blatant in the reasons
of the Group of Six. It held that a convention existed after clarifying the
necessary provincial consent as a substantial measure of provincial consent
rather than unanimity. 97 This change was necessary because not all Canadian
political actors felt obliged to follow the unanimity rule. The group hastened
to point out that quantification of substantial consent was a political matter. It
was sufficient to decide that the federal government and two provinces did not
"pass muster".98
The selection of relevant amendments provides more evidence of resultorientation. Of the twenty-two amendments to the ConstitutionAct, 1867 the
Group of Six selected only five which directly affected the federal-provincial
balance of power. 99 The importance of this selection is underscored by the fact
that the Qu6bee and Manitoba Courts of Appeal"'O made a different selection
and held that there was no convention.
Finally the classification of the issues suggests a desire to resolve the
political deadlock. The Group of Six could have avoided the conventions issue
entirely by classifying it as non-justiciable. Instead, it held that the proposed
resolution was "unconstitutional" in the sense that it would be in breach of
convention. That such a conclusion would have a decisive impact in both the
Canadian and United Kingdom political arenas is not likely to have escaped
the politically astute Group of Six.
The dissent of Chief Justice Laskin and Justices Estey and McIntyre
abandoned the guise of legal purity adopted by them as members of the Group
of Seven. They do not, however, entirely abandon the legal reasoning model.
These dissenting reasons provide an example of the deductive branch of the
legal reasoning model. 10 Any pretense of inductive legal reasoning disappeared when the Group of Three proceeded to examine the convention issue,
which in its view of the law was non-justiciable. On the inductive model nonjusticiable questions would not be answered. The reasons given are in response
to the reasons of the Group of Six and of the Group of Two.
From the perspective of the Group of Three the desired result is the
preservation of Canadian federalism. It held that this federalism is not an ideal
form but rather one which accords a fair measure of federal paramountcy. It
97

Supranote 13, at 188.

98

Id. at 216.

99

Id. at 203. The Group of Six, after listing the twenty-two amendments since Confederation, concluded that only five were relevant as affecting federal-provincial relations in the sense of changing provincial legislative powers. These amendments were the
1930 natural resources agreements with the western provinces, the 1931. Stattte of
Westminster, the 1940 unemployment insurance amendment, the 1951 old age pensions
amendment and the second old age pensions amendment in 1964.
'ooSupra note 39.
101These reasons reflect the distinctive judicial style of the Chief Justice.
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did not require a convention of provincial consent, either substantial or
unanimous. Indeed, this group held that recognizing such a convention would
result in an unwarranted surrender of federal sovereignty. 102 This directly conflicts with the position of the Group of Two which held that the convention of
provincial consent recognizes the supremacy of the provinces within their own
spheres.
The reasoning of the Group of Three represents a view of federalism that
includes a strong federal government. Such a view is based on a traditional
legal reading of the ConstitutionAct, 1867.103 Why this view of federalism is
characterized as a legal construct and not a political one as ascribed to the
Group of Two is difficult to explain. An examination of the ConstitutionAct,
1867 and the constitutional precedents establishes a degree of federal
paramountcy. 104 In legal terms, the federal government was attempting to do
no more than send a resolution to the Queen requesting amendment. The actual change would have been made by the Parliament of the United Kingdom.
Whether this analysis is a legal fiction or not, it is the standard legal position.
Thus, by holding that the federal government can act unimpeded by a convention of provincial consent, the Group of Three espoused a particular legal view
of Canadian federalism. Whether such a view accords with political reality is
another matter.
Of course, the members of the Group of Three would also have political
views about the federal balance in Canada. These were not, however, the
operative factors in their judgment. Perhaps the judges have disguised their
result-orientation cleverly. Certainly the judgment of this group fits the deductive branch of the legal reasoning model better than the inductive branch. In its
selection of relevant amendments, this group demonstrates the fashioning of
reasons to suit a particular legal conclusion.
Like the Group of Six, the three dissenters carefully chose their amendment precedents. They introduced a unique criterion, namely, the degree of
provincial opposition to a proposed amendment.105 Their particular selection
revealed no convention of unanimous provincial consent. Changing the convention question to a substantial measure of provincial consent would have
been, in their view, a judicial invention 6f an amending formula for the ConstitutionAct, 1867 and, in fact, social engineering beyond the proper limits of
the judicial role. 106
F. Implicationsof the PatriationReference for FutureDecisions
In many respects the PatriationReference was an atypical case. It was a
Reference on the most controversial political issue in recent history, and in
102 Supra note 13, at 280-82.
103 Allegations of bias in favour of the federal government have been rejected by

Hogg, Is the Supreme Court of CanadaBiased in ConstitutionalCases (1979), 57 Can.
B. Rev. 721. Interestingly, an earlier study done by the Qudbec government also reached
the conclusion that there was no federal government bias. L'Ecuyer, cited by Hogg, at
722n. 6.
104 Examples are the federal declaratory power and the residual federal authority.
The judicially created doctrine of concurrency also emphasizes federal paramountcy.
105 Supra note 13, at 273.
106Id. at 280-82.
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dealing with it the Supreme Court was subjected to unparalleled public
scrutiny. 0 7 Nonetheless, it does offer insights into how the Court may deal
with the Charter of Rights. Certainly the American experience with a bill of
rights suggests that decisions about fundamental freedoms are rife with
political controversy.108 Furthermore, there were no clear precedents upon
which the PatriationReference could be decided and it thus tested the creativity of the Court. These are exactly the kinds of challenges that the Charterof
Rights will pose, particularly in the early days of its interpretation.
The PatriationReference reveals that there is a high degree of resultorientation in the Supreme Court's judicial process. If we accept that there
really are no neutral principles, legal or otherwise, then at least three of the
four judgments have a policy orientation. Unlike its American counterpart,
which is candid about its declarations of policy, the Canadian Supreme Court
still expresses itself in the form of the legal reasoning model. Drawing upon the
shared standards of Canadian society, the Court appears to apply legal principles to a particular fact situation. 19
Whether this shift to a policy-oriented decision is good or bad is a matter
of perspective. Indeed some suggest that to contrast legal reasoning with the
making of policy is a false dichotomy. Professor Fuller has described the
classic judicial role as "a collaborative articulation of shared purposes." 0
Whether such articulaton is a matter of legal reasoning or policy-making
would be difficult to decide. It is important to note that the purposes or
policies are to be shared and thus should be societal rather than personal.
Result-orientation can be a dangerous judicial model, if a judge decides
subjectively which results are desirable. That the judicial process is, to some
extent, subjective could not be seriously denied, but it does not follow that it is
exclusively so.
[P]erhaps the fundamental question can be said to be whether judicial decisionmaking is purely subjective and possibly, therefore, emotional, or whether it can

be said to be objective and rational. It is my contention that it is in large part rational, even if somewhat defectively so. It is objective in that, to the extent that
there is social consensus on a particular matter, it will enunciate that consensus. It
is rational in that the judge has the duty of integrating his decision with the rest of

the law, and also in that the judge must attempt rationally to justify even his value

judgments.11

107The flood of scholarly books and articles suggests a continued scrutiny. In addition to a special issue of the Alta. L. Rev. and several isolated articles there have also

been several books. McWhinney, Canada and the Constitution 1979-1982 (Toronto:
Univ. of Tor. Press, 1982) and Russell, supra note 96, are but two examples. Two of the
articles have been written by leading Canadian constitutional scholars: Lederman, The
Supreme Court of CanadaandBasic ConstitutionalAmendment - An Assessment of
Reference Re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Nos. 1, 2 and 3) (1982), 27
McGill L.J. 527 and Hogg, Comment on Reference Re Amendment of the Constitution
of Canada
(1981) (1982), 60 Can. B. Rev. 307.
8
'( The most obvious example of this is the on-going controversy that surrounds

school desegregation.
109
Supra note 3, at 471. Professor Weiler has criticized this adjudicative model for
producing "arid legalism" on the Canadian scene.
Ho Fuller, Human Purposeand NaturalLaw(1958), 3 Natural L.F. 68, at 73.
1
1 Supra note 4, at 665.
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To put this in the context of the PatriationReference, the members of the
Group of Six may or may not have been expressing their own views when they
wrote that unilateral patriation was unconstitutional in the conventional sense.
They were, however, articulating a view broadly held throughout the country.
To have ignored such opinions and taken a more legalistic view might have
produced a worse solution. Professor Lyon expressed this in a different context:
[M]y purpose has been to try to persuade lawyers in general and legal scholars in
particular of the urgent need for some new theoretical framework which will
revitalize the connection between "the law" and its ethical basis, and ensure a continuing contact between the two. I proceed from a conviction that the notion of
law as a prevailing force, separate and apart from justice, tends to be destructive
of human values. Whether the framework I suggest can effectively overcome this
defect I do not know, but I think those who reject the theoretical basis of the status
quo ought to propose an alternative. I think the exploration of a policy-science
model with its essential contextual approach is a step in the right direction. If
112I succeed in sowing doubts in the minds of some true believers I will be satisfied.
Not everyone agrees that judges should be recognized as political actors
and openly adopt a policy-making approach. Dworkin argues that people have
moral rights against the state and not just political ones.113 On this analysis, a
more principled decision-making taking account of moral claims would be the
only way a court could claim legitimate authority. However, considering that
the rights embedded in the Charterof Rights were established and modified by
a process of political lobbying, it is difficult to assert that these are moral
rights.
The Court's result-orientation should not be particularly surprising or
alarming. Being human, Judges are not inclined to follow any one model. This
has been substantiated even with respect to the traditionalist House of
Lords. 1 4 Courts have always been engaged in more policy-making than
lawyers care to admit. Much of it is done behind a smoke-screen of precedent
and logic. Competing values should be openly recognized so we can be clear
whose values they are. Are they the values of the judges, of a particular social
class or of society at large? These issues will be critical to the interpretation of
the Charterof Rights and should be openly addressed by the Supreme Court of
Canada.
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
The idea of a result-oriented or policy-making judiciary is alarming to
many Canadians. It conjures up images of the politicized United States
Supreme Court."15 Although Canadians do not want mechanical
12 Lyon, A Fresh Approach to ConstitutionalLaw: Use of a Policy-Science Model
(1967), 45 Can. B. Rev. 554, at 576. Professor Lyon argued that goal-oriented decisionmaking is desirable.
13 Supra note 28, at 131-49.
114 Murphy and Rawlings, After the Ancidn Regime: The Writing of Judgments in
the House of Lords 1979/80 (1981), 44 Mod. L. Rev. 617.
15 This was described in exaggerated fashion in Woodword and Armstrong, The
Brethren:Inside the Supreme Court(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979).
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jurisprudence, they are unlikely to embrace political jurisprudence as described by Professor Martin Shapiro:
The core of political jurisprudence is a vision of courts as political agencies and
judges as political actors.... In short, the attempt is to intellectually integrate the
judicial system into the matrix of government and politics in which it actually
operates and to examine courts and judges as participants in the political process
rather than presenting law, with a capital L, as an independent area of substantive
knowledge. Quite fundamentally political jurisprudence subordinates the study of
law, in the sense of a concrete and independent system of prescriptive statements,
to the study of men, in this instance those men who fulfill
116 their political functions
by the creation, application and interpretation of law.
American courts do not in fact act as mere power brokers. Indeed, they
have developed a wealth of judicial methodologies and strategies that should
interest Canadian judges and legal scholars. The record of the Canadian
Supreme Court on the Bill of Rights underscores the need for fresh and innovative techniques, especially since interpreting an entrenched bill of rights is
a unique task. A general division of judges into those dedicated to legal principles and those concerned with results is insufficient.
One school of American interpretation can be labelled "textual": the
judge fixes on the exact words of the Constitution itself. Mr. Justice Black eloquently articulated the rationale for this strategy:
Our Constitution was not written in the sands to be washed away by each wave of
new judges blown in by each successive political wind which brings new political
administrations into temporary power. Rather, our constitution was fashioned to
perpetuate liberty and justice by marking clear, explicit, and lasting constitutional
boundaries for trials. One need look no further than the language of that sacred
document itself to be assured that defendants charged with crime are to be accorded due process of law - that is, they are to be tried as the Constitution and the
laws passed pursuant to it prescribe and not under arbitrary procedures that a particular majority of sitting judges may see fit to label as "fair" and "decent." I
wholly, completely, and permanently reject the so-called "activist" philosophy of
some judges which leads them to construe our Constitution as meaning what they
now
think it should mean in the interest of "fairness and decency" as they see
117
it.

This statement expresses a kind of Constitution worship that fortunately
has yet to infect Canada. On the surface, this approach would promote
judicial restraint and deference to the intent of the legislators as expressed in
the Constitution. At first blush, it would be attractive to Canadian judges
because British style judicial restraint has been the norm in Canada, with the
possible exception of the 1950s. It would allow them to restrict themselves to
the literal statutory analysis that frequently characterizes decisions on the
distribution of powers under the ConstitutionAct, 1867.

As indicated earlier, however, interpretation is not a neutral process. It can
result in an activist and creative interpretation of the Constitution, and the
record of Mr. Justice Black bears witness to that fact. This is especially true
Shapiro, PoliticalJurisprudence(1963-64), 52 Kentucky L.J. 294, at 297.
Turner v. United States 396 U.S. 398, at 426 (1970), (per Black J. dissenting).
This same approach was also demonstrated by Black J.'s dissenting opinion in Griswold
v. Connecticut381 U.S. 479 (1965).
116
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when the words of the constitutional text are broad and abstract in nature. Of
course, broad words can be interpreted narrowly, as the Canadian Supreme
Court demonstrated in its Bill of Rights decisions. In Canada, a strict textual
approach may well be used to limit the words of the Charterof Rights rather
than expand them.
Interest balancing is one of the most common methods of resolving bill of
rights issues. It has become so prevalent in the United States that Professor
Wechsler"18 and others have called for a retreat from the overt balancing of
values and for a return to principles. This judicial balancing of interests would
not be new to Canadian judges but doing it openly would be an innovation.
Even when there is an obvious conflict of values, the Canadian Supreme
Court, and judges generally, still tend to couch their decisions in logic and
precedent.
There are significant problems inherent in interest balancing: whose interests are in fact being balanced?; are the interests of a particular social group
more frequently sacrificed than those of other groups?; what kind of judges
are best suited to this kind of decision-making? These difficult questions may
become more relevant to Canada because section 1 of the Charter of Rights
appears to invite some degree of interest balancing:
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and

freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

Whether the Canadian Supreme Court will directly balance the value of
limiting freedoms in the name of the collective good against the independent
value of individual freedom is not a real issue. They will have to do so. A
harder question is whether they will do it openly or hide behind a subterfuge of
precedent. Which competing value will prevail - the state's or the
individual's? This is where the Canadian judicial tradition will probably tip the
scales in favour of the state.
A final judicial strategy has been labelled the "preferred freedoms" approach." 9 To a court this is an invitation to activism. It involves important
judicial choices which may be out of step with the general view. Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka120 is an example of such a choice. On this
model there is a presumption against invading preferred freedoms, and any
statute which should do so would be strictly construed. Such a statute would
not be saved by the fact that, on balance, it is a reasonable restriction on the
right in issue. This approach is clearly not deferential to legislators.
Mr. Justice Douglas, of the Supreme Court of the United States, is an exponent
of preferred freedoms. His majority judgment in Griswold v. Connecticut1 2l is an example. He held that certain rights were so basic that ancillary
rights were included as part of the penumbra of the specific amendments. Us-

18Supra note 78, at 19.
19 Ducat, Modes of ConstitutionalInterpretation(St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1978).
120347
U.S. 483 (1954).
21

1 Supra note 47, at 480-86.
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ing this analysis Mr. Justice Douglas held that there was a constitutional right
to privacy.
In Canada, the non obstante clause in the Charterof Rights prevents the
courts from having the final word as to which freedoms are preferred.
Nonetheless, there are aspects of the two-tier preferred-freedoms approach
that are relevant to the Charter of Rights. There are different categories of
rights enumerated in the Charter. Some are in a special class in that they are
not subject to the section 33 override clause. 122 The rights in section 2 of the
Charter are labelled "Fundamental Freedoms". Is this a legislative designation of a preferred category? It will be interesting to see if different standards
of review are applied to different categories of rights.
The entrenchment of rights in the Constitution should have important
practical effects upon how a court operates. It will require an expanded con123
cept of judicial notice and an increase in the use of extrinsic evidence.
Another lesson from the American experience is that the Supreme Court must
be flexible and willing to depart from precedent as social conditions change. 124
In order to decide whether there has been discrimination under section 15(1) of
the Charter or whether an affirmative action programme pursuant to section
15(2) is warranted, a court will need social, political and economic facts,
necessitating an expanded use of the brief amicus curiae and possibly a movement towards a Brandeis-style brief. This development might import a kind of
judicial lobbying which has been rare in Canada. 125 Lawyers will also need to
change some courtroom habits, but such matters go beyond the scope of this
study.
V.

THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA: A CALL FOR CREATIVITY

The fate of the Charterof Rights ultimately rests with the Supreme Court
of Canada. At most the experiences of other legal systems can offer guidance.
Professor Mark MacGuigan described the abolition of appeals to the Privy
126
Council as a muted call for gradualism and not a mandate for creativity.
Our Supreme Court may consider that an entrenched Charterof Rights with a
legislative override provision sounds the same note of caution.

122 Democratic Rights in ss. 3-5, Mobility Rights in s. 6 and Language Rights in ss.
16-23 of the CharterofRights.
123 There has already been some extension of these concepts in Canada in recent
constitutional cases. Re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373 and Patriation
Reference,
supra note 13.
124
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) and Brown v. Bd. of Education, 374
U.S. 483 (1954) are illustrative of the American Court's departure from precedent. In
A.G. Ont. v. Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] A.C. 193 the Privy Council
asserted that a court should rarely depart from past decisions. Even in 1967 the Canadian Supreme Court was only willing to depart from precedent for compelling reasons.
Binusv. R., [1967] S.C.R. 594, at 601.
125 Weiler, supra note 3, at 448 suggests that the Brandeis Brief was an early form of
lobbying. There has been unofficial lobbying in Canada as gay rights groups paraded
outside the Supreme Court during hearings in GayAlliance v. Vancouver Sun (1979), 27
N.R. 117
(S.C.C.).
126 Supra note 4, at 638.
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It is most unlikely that the Court will disregard its past judicial habits. At
least in its early days the narrow interpretation of the Bill of Rights is likely to
haunt the Charter. 127 Canada's Supreme Court has not been noted for its
creative advances in the law. Professor Read, former Dean of Dalhousie Law
School, painted a bleak picture:
... a perusal of Canadian law reports not only verifies an absence of creative
approach, but conveys the impression that most of the opinions reported there are
those of English judges applying English law in Canada, rather than those of
Canadian judges developing Canadian law to meet Canadian needs with guidance
of English precedent. 128
Chief Justice Laskin is much more optimistic about the creative potential
of the Court. 129 When still a law professor in 1951, he made a plea for a new
departure by the Supreme Court:
What is required is the same free range in inquiry which animated the Court in
the early days of its existence especially in constitutional cases where it took its inspiration from Canadian sources. Empiricism not dogmatism, imagination rather
than literalness, are the30qualities through which the judges can give their Court the
stamp of personality. 1
In December, 1973, the Prime Minister broke with tradition and appointed Laskin as Chief Justice of Canada, by passing the senior judge of the
Court, Mr. Justice Martland. Justices Laskin and Martland have responded
very differently to the Canadian Bill of Rights. The day after his retirement
from the Supreme Court in February 1982, Mr. Justice Martland candidly admitted that he was opposed to the CharterofRights.131 He also disapproved of
the activist judicial role implicit in an entrenched bill of rights. 132 Chief Justice
Laskin, on the other hand, has given every indication that he is anxious to
meet the challenge of the Charter. 33
Nonetheless it would be naive to be too optimistic about recent changes of
personnel on the Court. In spite of the retirement of Justices Pigeon and
Martland and the imminent retirement of Mr. Justice Ritchie, the character of
the Court will not necessarily change. Their replacements are likely to come
127 Cook v. The Queen, an unreported decision of March 16, 1983 (N.S.C.A.) suggests that the Bill of Rights is of little assistance in cases concerning the Charter of
Rights (per Hart J.A.), at 26. However, many other courts have relied heavily on the
Bill of Rights cases as has the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal itself in an earlier case concerning detention and the Charter: R. v. Currie, an unreported decision of February
1983 (N.S.C.A.). One case relying heavily on previous Canadian authority is R. v.
McIntyre, an unreported decision of May 14, 1982 (Alta. Q.B.). There are other cases
taking a more adventurous approach: R. v. Oakes, an unreported decision of February
2, 1983 (Ont. C.A.).
128
Read, The JudicialProcess in Common Law Canada (1959), 37 Can. B. Rev.
265, at 268, cited in Laskin, supra note 6, at 17.
129
Supra note 6, at 18.
130Laskin, The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of andfor Canadians
(1951), 29 Can. B. Rev. 1038, at 1076.
131
Sweet, "The rightwing clipped" Alberta Report, I Mar. 1982 at 66.
132Supra note 72.
13 3 MacKay v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 370 is one example of Laskin C.J.'s attempts to give life to the Bill ofRights.
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from the same background and social class. These factors may be more important than judicial personality. 134 Even Chief Justice Laskin has recognized that
there arp institutional restrictions on the individuality of the judge.135 Canadians should not too quickly adopt the cult of judicial personality.
The Charter itself is a classic Canadian compromise which gives rights
with one hand and takes them away with the other. In the context of Canadian
constitutional development, it is highly probable that Canadian judges will
give a broad meaning to section 1 of the Charter and discover that there are
many "reasonable limits" on rights, which can be demonstrably justified in a
society as free and democratic as Canada. However, such conclusions are likely
to find favour with the great majority of Canadian citizens. Judges will not be
the inhibitors of the public will but rather its interpreters.
If the Supreme Court is to accord any significance to the Charter of
Rights it must be innovative and creative. However, we should not expect an
overnight revolution.136 Drastic change is neither desirable nor mandated by
the quasi-entrenchment of rights in the Charterof Rights. Courts, as part of
Canada's institutional structure, will not fashion a revolution where none was
intended. Nonetheless, the performance of the Supreme Court in the Patriation Reference reveals some signs of creativity. An increasing number of
Supreme Court judges appear to recognize that law is a means rather than an
end. They also demonstrate a more flexible and responsive judicial process
which, if followed, will assist the Court in meeting the new challenges of the
Charterof Rights.

134 Hartzler, Justice, Legal Systems and Societal Structure (New York: Dunellen

Pub. Co., 1976) at 90.
135 Laskin, The InstitutionalCharacterof the Judge(London: Oxford Press, 1972).
136 The non obstante clause in s. 33 of the Charter of Rights introduces a perverse
kind of double jeopardy for the protection of rights in Canada. If the courts give a
broad interpretation to certain sections of the Charter then the legislators may override
that decision. This means that unpopular groups such as gays or prison inmates may
receive little real protections from an intolerant society.

